Introduction
In Germany, a new statutory minimum wage of e8.50 per hour of work came into force on 1 January 2015. The relevance of the minimum wage legislation draws on its generality. A high affectedness of establishments in the extensive and intensive margin creates a severe wage setting restriction (Bellmann et al. (2015) ), which may result in severe employment losses. Even though potential employment effects were heavily debated in advance and have been extensively analyzed for other countries, 1 such employment effects are ultimately an empirical question, and prominent economists argue in favor of independent scientific ex-post evaluations (e.g., Möller (2014) ; Zimmermann (2014) ). Corresponding to this claim, I provide a first approach by analyzing how the minimum wage affected the employers' employment expectations and uncertainties after the law was announced but before it came into force. Overall, only few studies address announcement effects of legislations, where a famous exemption is a study by Ahern/Dittmar (2012) , who analyze the stock market response to the announcement of a female board quota in Norway and find sizable effects.
The question whether the German minimum wage has had negative effects ahead of its introduction entered the public debate after the German Council of Economic Experts ("Sachverständigenrat") published its yearly report. This report raised the possibility that the law already dampened the economic development in 2014 (Sachverständigenrat (2014) ).
This was criticized by the German chancellor Angela Merkel stating: "It is not trivial to understand how a decision, which is not in force dampens the economic development," ZEIT ONLINE (2014). While macro economic effects ahead of the minimum wage introduction are indeed unlikely and difficult to identify, I contribute to this political debate by analyzing whether employer expectations change already in 2014 after the law was announced.
Economically, the analysis of employer expectations and uncertainties is of particular interest as uncertainties affect individual decision making in various microeconomic circumstances (Von Neumann/Morgenstern (1944) ; Akerlof (1970) ). But also at the level of firms uncertainties have shown to exert real effects. Empirical studies, which analyze the link between firm-level uncertainties and real adjustments, show that uncertainties affect investment decisions (Bloom (2009) ), production levels (Bachmann/Elstner/Sims (2013) ), and employment decisions, e.g., by increasing layoffs (Mecikovsky/Meier (2015) ).
Anticipatory changes in employer expectations are also of interest to empirical researchers as most empirical evaluation methods require an exogenous treatment event while excluding any kind of anticipation by assumption. Most of the recent studies analyzing employment effects of minimum wages in fact address the issue of anticipation (Dickens/Manning (2004) ; Dube/Lester/Reich (2010) ). However, anticipatory adjustments can severely bias simple difference-in-differences estimates and should be treated cautiously. For Germany, first descriptive evidence points at a meaningful magnitude of anticipatory adjustments in wages (Bellmann et al. (2015) ; Kubis/Rebien/Weber (2015) ). I add to this evidence by looking at whether anticipatory adjustments in employer expectations are observed in real data.
To analyze the minimum wage effect on employment expectations and uncertainties, I apply a difference-in-differences analysis comparing establishments by their affectedness.
The IAB Establishment Panel allows to distinguish affected from unaffected employers ahead of the minimum wage introduction and also includes the employers' assessments of the expected employment development, which I hypothesize to respond in the treatment year 2014 when the law was announced but not in force. In 2014, the survey information was collected between June and September, which is a few months before the minimum wage came into force. I estimate the response on the expected employment development but also on whether the employment development is uncertain. Finally, I also analyze whether affected employers more likely report wage costs to become a problem. This provides insights on the source of the expectations concerning employment.
In an additional step, I use the estimated responses in expectations from ahead of the minimum wage introduction to approximate the magnitude of employment losses which are likely to occur solely due to lowered expectations. This adds to the literature predicting employment effects using micro simulations in ex-ante evaluations (Arni et al. (2014) ; Knabe/Schöb/Thum (2014)). These studies find substantial effects on employment, but aim to predict a comprehensive employment effect. By contrast, I quantify employment reductions solely due to employer expectations, which most likely undercuts the overall employment effect.
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the minimum wage law and the time line of its adoption. Section 3 summarizes the data and the outcome variables of interest.
Section 4 provides a descriptive analysis of the outcome variables. Section 5 presents the baseline estimation results, Section 6 shows two major robustness checks, and Section 7 allows for effect heterogeneities with respect to individual characteristics of the interview respondent. Section 8 translates the effects into real employment adjustments and Section 9 concludes.
Institutional background
The new German minimum wage came into force on 1 January 2015 and requires hourly wages of at least e8.50. It is the first general minimum wage in Germany which applies to all industries with only minor exemptions. It complements already existing industry specific minimum wages, which were in force, e.g., in the construction sector, for hair dressers, and roofers. 2 Sectorial minimum wages which under-cut the new minimum are allowed to delay their compliance for two-years. Similarly, industry specific collective bargaining agreements are also conceded an adjustment period of two years until 31 December 2016.
Other exemptions from the minimum wage include youth-employment below the age of 18 years, apprenticeship trainees, compulsory internships of college students, and finally, long term unemployed are allowed to under-cut the minimum wage for the first 6 month after reemployment. 
Treatment assignment
I distinguish between a treatment group, which comprises establishments affected by the minimum wage, and a control group, which is unaffected. The group of affected establishments is defined in two alternative ways. First, the extensive margin affectedness includes all establishments with at least one employee with an hourly wage below e8.50 in 2014.
Second, the intensive margin affectedness again includes all establishments that have at least one affected employee, but it weights the establishment-level affectedness by the fraction of affected employees. The group of control establishments comprises only establishments without any employees affected by the minimum wage. 5
A major issue for the exact differentiation between affected and unaffected establishments are establishments which adjusted wages ahead of the 2014 survey. If establishments already adjusted wages before the information was collected, their true affectedness is not revealed. This is a major issue since the public policy discussion makes anticipatory wage adjustments likely and first descriptive evidence already points at the prevalence of such anticipatory wage adjustments (Bellmann et al. (2015) ; Kubis/Rebien/Weber (2015)). Since the exact affectedness of anticipating establishments is unknown, I exclude them from the analysis. 6 3 In most cases the interview respondent has a managerial job-position (83 percent of the cases). I present heterogeneities with respect to the job position of the respondents in Section 7. 4 Previous studies mostly used unbalanced panels when using the IAB-Establishment Panel, which increases sample size due to sample attrition. However, the results presented in this article do not rely on the unbalancedness. 5 To exclude false or socially desirable responses, a "unknown" category was allowed in the survey, which was included to capture all establishments that were not sure about their affectedness. Only 1.3 percent of the establishments made use of this category in the survey and I exclude these establishments from the analysis. 6 A robustness check in Online Appendix A shows that this exclusion does not affect any of the results, and presents separate effects for this group of establishments. Another major issue for the construction of a control group of unaffected establishments is general equilibrium effects. Since I concentrate on expectations ahead of the minimum wage introduction, such indirect general equilibrium effects are unlikely and are excluded by assumption. 7 However, indirect effects of the minimum wage would rather have an adverse impact on the control group and therefore the estimated treatment effects would show lower bounds of the true effects. Table 2 shows a description of affected and unaffected establishments as well as the excluded group of anticipating plants. 11 percent of the establishments in the sample are affected, 78.9 percent are unaffected and 10.1 percent have been excluded due to anticipation. The average establishment size is much larger for unaffected plants, but as depicted by the median, the mean-divergence is driven by large outliers. 8 Column 3 shows that median and average employment are both larger for the excluded group of anticipating establishments, which is most likely driven by the fact that large establishments have a greater chance for the incidence of such anticipatory wage adjustments.
Also summarized in Table 2 , affected establishments represent about 3 203 000 employees in the German population. The gross number of represented employees is relevant when translating the employer expectations into an overall employment figure, see Section 8. Table 2 further shows, such as in Bellmann et al. (2015) , that the intensive margin affectedness is very emphasized as about 38 percent of the employees are affected within affected establishments. This large intensive margin makes adjustments likely as the minimum wage is largely binding for affected establishments.
The last four rows of Table 2 display averages of some other covariates by affectedness.
The averages show that affected establishments have significantly larger shares of parttime and female employees. It also reveals a lower affectedness if industrial relations such as collective bargaining or works councils are present. The difference-in-differences approach, which I use for the analysis, requires that affected and unaffected establishments behave similar in the absence of treatment. This is more plausible if establishments are similar. While fixed effects can already control for time constant differences, two more robustness checks are presented in this respect. First, the regression results are presented with and without control variables. Second, a propensity score weighting conditional on lagged outcomes and lagged covariates is presented for robustness. 
Outcome variables of interest
Additional to the two outcomes concerning the expected employment development, I use the response to the survey question asking employers whether wage costs are likely to become a problem within the upcoming two years. This item provides an additional piece of information concerning the reasons of the employers' employment expectations. For this question, the survey only allows for a "yes" or "no" response and does not allow to further differentiate in the intensity that wage costs become a problem. Moreover, for this variable I rely on 2010 and 2012 as the pre-treatment years for comparison because this question is only surveyed in a biennial mode. 9 In the survey, outcome variables are independent from the affectedness by the minimum wage. While the expectations are placed at very beginning (questions 4 and 5), the minimum wage affectedness is one of the last questions in the survey (questions 76 and 77).
4 Descriptive analysis 4.1 Descriptive difference-in-differences Table 3 presents a summary of the sample size by outcome variables. The sample is slightly smaller when looking at the expected employment development because this outcome requires a foreseeable employment development, i.e., that it is not uncertain. From the second row onwards, Table 3 presents sample means of the outcome variables by affectedness. I also present the difference of the 2014 and 2013 averages, which is the time-trend of the outcome variables by affectedness. Finally, the last row displays the difference of these developments, which is the descriptive difference-in-differences estimate. The employment uncertainty in columns (1) and (2) is on average between 5 and 6 percentage points. However, it spikes for affected establishments in 2014, which implies an increased descriptive uncertainty in this group of establishments. In columns (3) and (4), the expected employment development is slightly larger for unaffected plants in both years.
However, in 2014 the expected employment development decreases for affected plants but increases for unaffected plants implying a negative descriptive difference-in-differences estimate. The outcome that wage costs become a problem is reported by about 20 percent of the plants (columns 5 and 6). This value increases to more than 30 percent among the group of affected establishments in 2014, which implies a large descriptive effect.
Graphical analysis
In the graphical analysis, I present time series of the outcome variables by affectedness. the graph shows very similar trends, but in 2014 it shows a much stronger increase in the problem of wage costs for affected establishments. This pattern descriptively shows that wage costs become a problem for the group of affected employers. 
Baseline results
In this section, I present regression results from a difference-in-differences specification.
The regression analysis adds to the descriptive analysis by estimating the magnitude of the visually observed responses, it allows to control for covariates, and provides a judgement about the statistical precision of such effects. I use a standard difference-in-differences type of regression specification with establishment fixed effects. This controls for any timeconstant differences across establishments including structural differences implied by the sector or the location. 2014 is defined as the treatment period of interest, 10 because in 2014 the introduction of the minimum wage was decided.
δ is the treatment effect on the treated establishments (ToT) and quantifies the effects of interest, which are the responses in expectations of affected plants in comparison with an unaffected control group. Ψ i captures establishment fixed effects, γ t are time fixed effects, and it is an idiosyncratic error term with an establishment-level error correlation.
Estimates of δ are presented in Tables 4 to 6. Each of these tables addresses one of the hypothesized outcomes. The first three columns present results from a specification in which the affectedness is defined by the extensive margin and the latter three columns define the affectedness by the intensive margin (fraction of affected employees). 11 (2) and (5) are dummies for collective bargaining, works councils, and fractions of females and high qualified employees. For the placebo treatment in columns (3) and (6), the treatment is assigned to 2013 and 2014 is excluded from the regression.
Data source: IAB Establishment Panel 2010-2014, analysis sample. Number of establishments as in Table 3 .
In Table 4 , the effect on the incidence that the employment development is uncertain ahead of the minimum wage introduction is 2.7 percentage points (column 1). Since on average only 6 percent of the establishments report an uncertain employment development, this effect implies that the affected employers' uncertainty rises by about 40 percent. The effect is robust when adding controls, which include the shares of part-time and full-time employees; but also participation in collective bargaining and the existence of a works council.
Column 3 presents a placebo test in which the treatment year is artificially assigned to the year 2013, when the minimum wage was not yet a relevant threat to affected employers.
The placebo effect is small and insignificant.
When the affectedness is defined by the intensive margin (columns 4-6), the effect with and without covariates is about 6 percentage points. The placebo test is again small and insignificant. Compared with the extensive margin, the effect size is similar. Since in fact 10 Online Appendix B shows that the results are fully robust towards a simple difference-in-difference specification using OLS and a specification with random effects. 11 Online Appendix C presents descriptive employment trends in which the treatment group is weighted by the intensive margin affectedness.
only 38 percent of the employees are affected within affected establishments, the intensive margin effect should be multiplied by 0.38 in order to correspond with the extensive margin effect. (2) and (5) are dummies for collective bargaining, works councils, and fractions of females and high qualified employees. For the placebo treatment in columns (3) and (6), the treatment is assigned to 2013 and 2014 is excluded from the regression.
When looking at the expected employment development in Table 5 , the forthcoming minimum wage lowers the affected establishments' employment expectation by −0.8 percent.
Again, this effect is larger when looking at the intensive margin affectedness. The placebo tests are small and statistically insignificant. These results show that the minimum wage reduces the expected employment development additional to the increased employment uncertainty. (2) and (5) are dummies for collective bargaining, works councils, and fractions of females and high qualified employees. For the placebo treatment in columns (3) and (6), the treatment is assigned to 2013 and 2014 is excluded from the regression. In Table 6 , the treatment effect on the incidence that personnel costs become a problem is 10 percentage points in the extensive margin. In relative terms this implies an increase by about 40 percent. The intensive margin effect is 22 percentage points, which is again very comparable in size. Moreover, both placebo effects are not significantly different from zero. The result hints at a potential channel for the effects on employment expectations.
As implied by standard microeconomic theory, minimum wages may reduce labor demand because employers cannot afford paying wages exceeding the value of marginal product.
In Table 7 , I exploit variation in the treatment intensity and estimate separate effects on employer expectations. For this purpose I split the affectedness into 5 intensities, which are The results in Table 7 show that the adverse responses in the affected employers' expec- To provide a descriptive overview of the employers that adjusted their expectations by the largest magnitudes, Table 8 displays sample averages by intensities of affectedness.
Severely affected employers are on average slightly smaller in terms of employment, have higher employment turnover rates, the fraction of qualified workers is relatively lower, and on average they employ larger fractions of part-time and female employees. These are the typical characteristics that explain affectedness by the minimum wage. Looking at the lower part of Table 8 , which displays averages of dummy variables, the most severely affected establishments less likely have a works council and less likely participate in collective bargaining; they more likely report high product market competition, tend to be younger and are much more likely located in the Eastern part of Germany. When interacting the treatment effects of Tables 4 to 7 with variables of 
Matching on pre-treatment trends
To assess whether the treatment effects are robust to a different, but with respect to the parallel trends assumption harmonized control group, I present a robustness check in which I weight control establishments based on their similarity in the pre-treatment outcome levels. The intuition of this robustness check is in line with the synthetic control method by Abadie/Diamond/Hainmueller (2010), where a weighted control group is matched to the treated units. 13 I weight the control units based on the propensity score, which is estimated conditional on pre-treatment levels of the outcome variables, but also conditional on covariates. The covariates control for major differences between treatment and control group and comprise lagged values of all variables described in Table 8 . 13 The synthetic control method tends to assign a large weight on only few control units (Abadie/Diamond/Hainmueller (2015)). When looking at large observational data, in which individuals or establishments are the units of observation, this may lead to bad finite sample properties. However, I am not aware of any explicit investigations of this issue.
I apply the propensity score weighting estimator first proposed in Rosenbaum (1987) . 14 The treatment effect on the affected establishments is specified in equation 3 (Wooldridge (2010)).
Affected i is the treatment variable indicating affected establishments. To estimate an effect for different intensities of affectedness, I apply treatment dummies with differing intensities of affectedness as in Table 7 but in separate estimations.ρ is the fraction of affected establishments in the sample, andp(·) is the estimated propensity score from a logit regression conditional on lagged levels of y defined as y t−1 , . . . , y t−5 , dummies indicating missing observations in the previous panel waves (m t−1 , . . . , m t−5 ), and lagged covariates (x t−1 ). The first group of variables controls for the similarity of pre-treatment trends, the second controls for selective entry in the survey, and the third group of variables controls for differences in observable characteristics.
For consistency the propensity score weighting estimator requires two assumptions (Heckman/Ichimura/Todd (1998)). 15 First, it requires mean-ignorability of the treatment assign-
Mean-ignorability requires that in the absence of treatment the mean-outcome conditional on y t−1 , . . . , y t−5 , m t−1 , . . . , m t−5 , and x t−1 is not different for affected and unaffected plants. I believe that this crucial assumption is plausible because there is no obvious reason why in the absence of treatment the mean-outcome would depend on the affectedness after partialing out structural differences in covariates as well as differences in the trends of y.
Second, consistency requires for all possible combinations of y t−1 , . . . , y t−5 , m t−1 , . . . , m t−5 , x t−1 that P(Affected = 1|y t−1 , . . . , y t−5 , m t−1 , . . . , m t−5 , x t−1 ) < 1.
This second assumption is a so-called overlap assumption requiring untreated establishments which serve as counterfactual controls for each covariate combination in the data.
The propensity score weighting estimates are displayed in Table 9 . 16 In columns 1 to 3, the treatment variable indicates all affected establishments irrespective of their margin of affectedness. Columns 4 to 6 display treatment effects for different levels of affectedness defined by the fraction of affected employees which is 1-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80%, 14 The propensity score weighting estimates can be precisely replicated using a matching method which compares nearest neighbors based on the Mahalanobis metric (e.g., Imbens (2015)). 15 See also the survey by Imbens/Wooldridge (2009) or the textbook by Wooldridge (2010) . 16 Online Appendix D presents a graphical evaluation of the common support, i.e., the overlap of the propensity score for affected and unaffected plants. The results in the first three columns are not qualitatively different from Tables 4 to 6.
The effects are very similar in size supporting an effect of the minimum wage on employer expectations. As depicted by the estimates for different degrees of affectedness in columns 4 to 6, the responses in expectations increase when employers are largely affected. I conclude that the treatment effects on all three outcomes are robust when controlling for lagged outcomes and observable characteristics.
Non-linear difference-in-differences
In this subsection, I estimate probit based non-linear regressions on the two binary outcomes, which are the employment uncertainty and the problem of wage costs:
where ψ is the group effect, γ is the effect of the treatment year 2014, and Affected * d 2014 is the interaction of interest. In non-linear models, the identification of a treatment effect is less intuitive as group and time effects do not drop when taking the respective differences (Lechner (2011) ). However, Puhani (2012) derives the treatment effect on the treated (ToT) based on the potential outcomes framework. 17
In line with Puhani (2012) 
When looking at the incidence of affectedness of establishments, i.e., by using the dummyaffectedness without differentiating in the intensity, equation 8 simplifies by inserting a = 1. When I stead use the average fraction of affected employees a = 0.38, the marginal effect is the treatment effect evaluated at the average affectedness of affected establishments. 
Effect on employment uncertainties
ToT non-linear 0.035*** 0.023*** (0.011) (0.007)
Effect on the concern of raising wage costs Table 3 . Table 10 displays the treatment effects on the affected establishments for the employment uncertainty and the incidence that wage costs become a problem, which are both binary.
Such as in the baseline regressions, Table 10 presents a positive and significant response in the employment uncertainty. Similarly, the effect on wage costs becoming a problem is again positive but smaller compared with Table 6 . However, both effects remain statistically 17 Puhani (2012) shows that marginal effects in non-linear difference-in-differences are differences in crossdifferences and therefore differ from simple cross-differences as in Ai/Norton (2003) . This is because the interaction itself is the only treatment variable in difference-in-differences, whereas group and time effects are interpreted as control variables (Puhani (2012)). significant and meaningful in size. Differences in the size of the coefficients are plausible as the treated group is evaluated at a specific point along the estimated cumulative distribution function, which can be rather steep or flat.
Heterogeneities by respondent characteristics
In addition to the regular survey questions, the IAB Establishment Panel collects information on the survey respondent, which is a contact person in the establishment. Since I analyze the minimum wage effect on expectations, characteristics of the respondent might be relevant to explain heterogeneities in the expectations. To estimate the effects for different respondents, I fully interact the baseline difference-in-differences specification by respondent characteristics, which include two age groups (below 50 and at least 50), gender, and the job position (manager position and non-managerial position):
To retrieve effects for each type of respondent, each of the characteristic in C i is meanadjusted, i.e. C i = Characteristic i − Characteristic. This ensures that the baseline effect δ 1 is estimated for the average respondent. The treatment effects for specific groups-say female respondents-is then defined by ToT f emales = δ 1 + (1 − f emale) * δ 2 , whereas the effect for male respondents is ToT males = δ 1 + (0 − f emale) * δ 2 .
Because of missing information in the respondent characteristics, the sample size reduces to 8,804 establishments. Of the respondents 36 percent are females and 64 percent are males. 56 percent are below 50 years of age and 44 percent are at least 50 years old.
Finally, 84 percent of the respondents can be classified as managers, whereas the remaining 16 percent are in regular non-managerial job positions. Although the sample size is slightly smaller, Table 11 shows the same baseline effects as presented in Tables 4 to 6 .
Looking at the effect heterogeneities by age, the treatment effects also remain unchanged.
For male respondents the effects on employment uncertainties and the expected employment development seem slightly larger. However, the most impressive effect difference is observed by job position of the respondent. When the respondent is a manager the magnitude of the effects increase, while they turn insignificant for the group of non-managerial respondents. For my analysis, the managers' expectations should be more important as managers ultimately decide over establishment policies such as reductions in employment.
Actual adjustments due to expectations
In this section, I analyze how employment expectations are related to actual changes in establishment-level employment. This provides an insight on the magnitude of the detected effects, which also allows to judge about the relevance of these anticipatory expectations. 
Baseline effects:
ToT 0.024*** -0.008** 0.106*** (0.009) (0.004) (0.018)
ToT by age-groups of respondents: (2015)). Technically, both outcomes are complementary as they are retrieved from a single survey question. Employers either report to be uncertain about the employment development or they report an explicit prediction concern-18 Online Appendix E demonstrated that this assumption is plausible as the relationship between expectations and realized adjustments is quite stable over time.
ing their expected employment development. This allows to add up the effects from both outcomes into a combined measure of employment adjustments. 
The regression model in equation 10 estimates the relationship between the expected employment development (explanatory variable) and actually realized changes in employment (dependent variable). This yields an exact estimate and a judgement on the precision.
Equation 10 also controls for an establishment fixed effect Ψ i , which captures permanent employer specific over-or underestimations of the expected employment development.
Moreover, the time effects γ t control for time-specific deviations from the relation, which could come along with an uncertainty shock induced by an unexpected crisis.
Using the same regression method, equation 11 quantifies the relation between employment uncertainties (explanatory variable) and actual employment changes (dependent variable). Given the relationship between the expected employment development and actually observed employment changes, I can translate the effect on expectations (Table 5) Since the response in expectation is 0.008 (Table 5) , the realized fraction is 0.5 (Table   12) , and the total employment in affected establishments is calculated as 3 203 051 (Table 2), the predicted employment loss due to responses in expectations corresponds to approximately 12 800 jobs. Since common trends in the absence of treatment are a major assumption in differencein-differences analyses, I provide a robustness check in which I weight the control group based on past levels of the outcome variables. Based on a propensity score weighting method, the results are similar compared with the baseline. In a second robustness check, I use a probit based non-linear difference-in-differences as suggested by Puhani (2012 The results in Table A1 show that the overall group of anticipating establishments has a much smaller effect on employment uncertainties and the expected employment development. When looking at columns 4 to 6, the group of employers which anticipates but is no longer affected shows no response in expectations, whereas the group of anticipating but still affected employers shows very similar expectations as the baseline treatment group. 
Conclusion

B Online Appendix: OLS and random effects estimation
In this online appendix, I re-estimate the baseline specifications using OLS and random effects instead of fixed effects. The OLS specification includes a group effect (affected i ) instead of fixed effects (Ψ i ):
The random effects specification also includes a group effect (affected i ), and in addition an establishment-specific random effect Ψ i , which is by assumption not correlated with other right hand side variables:
Technically, the results should not differ by much. In a balanced panel, difference-indifferences estimates from equations 2, 13, and 14 should lead to very similar point estimates. However, if the analysis sample is unbalanced, differences between fixed effects, random effects, and OLS can be driven by selective panel attrition.
The treatment effects from OLS regressions presented in Table B1 are very similar compared with the fixed effect specifications in the article, and also the treatment effects from random effects estimation (Table B2 ) are very similar. Moreover, they seem slightly more precisely estimated. ToT 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.002 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.009 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) Effect on the expected employment development ToT -0.008** -0.009** -0.002 -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.006 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Effect on the concern of raising wage costs ToT 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.006 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.026 (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035)
Notes: Presented coefficients are partial effects from OLS regressions. Cluster robust standard errors are presented in parentheses (cluster=establishment). Asterisks indicate significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10. Covariates in columns (2) and (5) ToT 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.001 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.009 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
Effect on the expected employment development
ToT -0.008** -0.009*** -0.002 -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.007 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) Effect on the concern of raising wage costs ToT 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.011 0.219*** 0.215*** 0.030 (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035)
Notes: Presented coefficients are partial effects from random effect regressions. Cluster robust standard errors are presented in parentheses (cluster=establishment). Asterisks indicate significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10. Covariates in columns (2) and (5) are dummies for collective bargaining, works councils, and fractions of females and high qualified employees.
C Online Appendix: Intensive margin employment trends
In this online appendix, I present the employment trends using the intensive margin treatment assignment. While the dashed line still represents unaffected plants, the red line comprises affected plants weighted by their intensive margin affectedness, which is the fraction of affected employees within affected plants. In figure C1 , the time series do not show meaningful differences compared with the extensive margin time trends presented in the paper. D Online Appendix: Propensity score overlap after propensity score weighting
In this online appendix, I provide a graphical description of the densities of the propensity scores by affectedness of establishments. This is important because it shows that there is sufficient common support in the propensity score for the estimates presented in section 6.1. Figure D1 presents the overlap for the outcome that the employment development is uncertain, Figure D2 for the expected employment development, and Figure D3 for the reported problem of rising wage costs. The graphs show that propensities scores of the control group largely overlap with the propensity scores of the treatment group for all outcomes and intensities of affectedness. Figure D1 : Common support in the propensity score for the outcome employment uncertainty 
